Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA)

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Objectives

- FMEA Terms
- What is FMEA?
- Why FMEA?
- Types of FMEA
- History
- FMEA Form
- Who uses FMEA
- Procedure
- RPN
- Implementation into design Process
- Severity
- Occurrence
- Detection
- Example, Limitation, Advantages

Fmea terms

- ☐ Failure
 - The loss of a function under stated conditions.
- ☐ A Failure Mode is:
 - The way in which the components, subassembly, product, input, or process could fail to perform its intended function.
 - Things that could go wrong.
 - Example: A fully fractured axle.
- Effects analysis
 - Studying the consequences of the various failure modes to determine their severity to the customer.

What is Fmea?

| Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a step by step approach for identifying all possible failures in a design, a manufacturing or a product or service. |
|--|
| FMEA is an inductive reasoning (forward logic). |
| It is a core task in <u>Reliability Engineering</u> , <u>Safety Engineering</u> and <u>Quality Engineering</u> . |
| It is based on experience with similar product or process or based on common Physics of failure logic. |
| Sometimes FMEA is Extended to FMECA to indicates that criticality analysis is performed too. |

Why fmea ???

| ☐ Methodology that facilitates | Process Improvement. |
|---|---|
| ☐ Improve internal and externa | l customer satisfaction. |
| ☐ Focuses on prevention. | |
| ☐ Identifying and eliminates co process or design. | oncerns early in the development of |
| ☐ FMEA may be a customer re | quirement (likely contractual) |
| ☐ FMEA may be required be an Quality Management Sy | n applicable estem Standard (possibly ISO) |

Types of FMEa

- □ Design focuses on component and subsystems.
- Process focuses on Manufacturing and Assembly processes.
- System focuses on global system functions.
- Service focuses on service functions.
- Software focuses on software functions.

History of fmea

☐ An offshoot of 1949 Military Procedure MIL-P-1629, entitled "Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis" ☐ Used as a reliability evaluation technique to determine the effect of system and equipment failures. ☐ Failures were classified according to their impact on mission success and personnel/equipment safety. ☐ Formally developed and applied by NASA in the 1960's to improve and verify reliability of space program hardware. ☐ The procedures called out in MIL-STD-1629A are the most widely accepted methods throughout the military and commercial industry.

The fmea form

Process/Product

| Product Hone | | | | | | Proparadky | Π | | r.u | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------------|--------|---|---------|--|---------|------|--|-------|---|---------|---------|--------|-----|
| Responsibles | | | | |] | FMEA Dana (Orig) | | (Fee | 0 | - 3 | | | | | |
| Process Step / Input | Potential Failure Mode | Potential Failure Effects | SE | Potential Causes | 0 0 0 | Current Controls | DE | | Actions Recommended | Resp. | Actions Taken | SE | 000 | DE | |
| What is the process step and Input under investigation? | the Key Input go wrong? | | VERITY | What causes the Key Input to go wrong? | URRENCE | What are the existing controls and procedures (inspection and test) that prevent either the cause or the Failure Mode? | -ECT-ON | RPN | What are the actions for reducing the occurrence of the cause, or improving detection? | | What are the completed actions taken with the recalculated RPN? | Y ERITY | URRENCE | ECTION | FFA |
| 1 | | | | | | | Г | 0 | | | | Г | | П | 1 |
| | | | | | Г | | Г | 0 | | | | Г | | | 1 |
| | | | | | Г | | Г | 0 | | | | Г | | | 1 |
| | | | Г | | Г | | Г | 0 | | | | T | | Г | 1 |
| | | F 1 | | | Г | | Г | 0 | | | | T | | Г | 1 |
| | | | ') | | | | 1 | • | | | | • | | | |
| _ | | |) | | 1 | $\overline{}$ | | r | | | <u> </u> | | | _ | - |

and their effects

failure modes and controls

assess actions

Who uses FMEA ???

- ☐ Engineers Worldwide in :
 - Nuclear Power plant.
 - Aerospace
 - Chemical Process Industries
 - Automotive Industries
- ☐ Healthcare
- □ Goal has been, and remains, to prevent accident accidents from occurring

Fmea: a team tool

- ☐ A Team approach is necessary.
- ☐ Team leader should be familiar with FMEA.
- ☐ The following should be considered for team members:
- Design Engineers
- II. Process Engineers
- III. Materials Suppliers
- IV. Operators
- V. Reliability
- VI. Suppliers
- VII.Customers

Fmea Procedure


- Determine failure mode for each process input.
- For each failure mode, determine effects Select a severity level for each effect.
- Identify potential causes of each failure mode Select an occurrence level for each cause.
- List current controls for each cause Select a detection for each cause.
- Calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN).
- Develop recommended action, assign responsible person and take actions.
- Assign the predicted Severity, Occurrence and Detection levels and compare RPNs

Risk Priority number (rpn)


$$\square$$
 Severity \times Occurrence \times Detection = RPN

- 1000 is maximum and 75* is considered OK!!!
- Severity (S)
 - Importance of the effects on customer requirements.
 - 1 = Not sever, 10 = very sever
- Occurrence (O)
 - Frequency with which a given cause occurs and creates failure modes.
 - 1 = NOT Likely, 10 = Very Likely
- · Detection (D)
 - The ability of the current control scheme to detect then prevent a given causes.
 - 1 = Easy to Detect, 10 = Not easy to Detect

Risk Priority number (rpn)



Risk Priority number (rpn)




Rating Scales

☐ There are a wide variety of scoring anchors. ☐ Two types of scales are 1-5 or 1-10. □ The 1-5 scale makes it easier for the teams to decide on scores. ☐ The 1-10 scale may allow for better precision in estimates and a wide variation in scores. □ Zero(0) Ranking not allowed for RPN Rating Scales.

Fmea timing

- ☐ FMEA should be updated
 - At the conceptual stage.
 - When changes are made to the design.
 - When new regulation are instituted.
 - When customer feedback indicates a problem.

Implementation into Design process



| | Severity Evaluation Criteria | |
|--------------------------------|---|------|
| Effect | Criteria: Severity of Effect | Rank |
| Hazardous - without warning | Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without warning | 10 |
| Hazardous - with warning | Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning | 9 |
| Very High | Vehicle/item inoperable, with loss of primary function. | 8 |
| High | Vehicle/item operable, but at reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied. | 7 |
| Moderate | Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/ Convience item(s) inoperable. Customer experiences discomfort. | 6 |
| Low | Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/ Convience item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. | 5 |
| Very Low | Fit & finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by average customers. | 4 |
| Minor | Fit & finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers. | 3 |
| Very Minor | Fit & finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers. | 2 |
| None | No effect. | 1* |

Ranking of Occurrence of Effect

50 per thousand cores

20 per thousand cores

10 per thousand cores

5 per thousand cores

2 per thousand cores

1 per thousand cores

0.5 per thousand cores

0.1 per thousand cores

</= 0.01 per thousand cores

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

| Probability of Failure | Possible Failure rates | Ranking | | | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|---------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Very High: Persistent | >/= 100 per thousand cores | 10 | | | | | |

failure

failure

failure

unlikely


High: Frequent failure

Moderate: Occasional

Low: Relatively few

Remote: Failure is

| Suggested Detection Evaluation Criteria | | | | | | |
|---|---|------|--|--|--|--|
| Detection | Criteria | Rank | | | | |
| Absolute Uncertainty | Design Control will not and/or cannot detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control. | 10 | | | | |
| Very Remote | Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 9 | | | | |
| Remote | Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 8 | | | | |
| Very Low | Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 7 | | | | |
| Low | Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 6 | | | | |
| Moderate | Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 5 | | | | |
| Moderately High | Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 4 | | | | |
| High | High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 3 | | | | |
| Very High | Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 2 | | | | |
| Almost Certain | Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. | 1* | | | | |



Fmea table for ball-point pen

| 1.00 | i | 12 | 2 | | (T) | ti fel | | | NI. | 20 |
|---------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|---------|-----------------------------------|-----------|--|----------|-----|-------------------------------|
| Part | Function | Potential failure Mode | Potential Effect of failure | SEVERTY | Potential Causes of failure | OCCURANCE | How will the potential failure be Detected ? | DETCTION | RPN | ACTIONS |
| Outer Tube | Provides grip for writer | Hole gets blocked | Vacuum on ink supply stops flow | 7 | Debris ingress into hole | 3 | Check clearance of hole | 5 | 105 | Make hole larger |
| Ink | Provides writing medium | Incorrect Viscosity (Low) | High flow | 4 | Too much solvent | 2 | QC on ink supply | 4 | 32 | Introduce more rigid QC |
| Ink | Provides writing medium | Incorrect Viscosity (High) | Low flow | 4 | Too little solvent | 2 | QC on ink supply | 3 | 24 | Introduce more rigid QC |

Fmea for Boiler tube

| Year | No. of Failure |
|------|-----------------|
| 2009 | A = 24 (Assume) |
| 2010 | B = 22 |
| 2011 | C = 26 |
| 2013 | D = 23 |
| 2014 | E=19 |
| 2015 | _ |

Risk Analysis of Boiler using Failure Mode & Effect Analysis

| Potential failure mode | Potential effect of failures | Potential causes | Severit y (S) | Occu rrenc e (O) | Detection (D) | RPN | Control Process Detection |
|------------------------------|---|---|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------|-----|------------------------------|
| Boiler Tube | 1. Water leakage 2. Cooling process stop 3. Unit had shut down 4. Water level not maintai ned | 1. Corrosion | X = 9 (let) | Y = 7 (let) | Z = 5 (let) | 315 | Water leakage |
| | | 2. Scale formation 3. Extremely combustion | | | | | Thickness of tube wall |
| | | had shut failure down 5. Poor water | | | | | Thermal stress |
| | | evel not naintai | | | | | Increased tube strain |
| | | | | | | | Alarms |

HFmea Example

- ☐ Suppose A Person who was a patient in the SMS Hospital, Jaipur. He/she died suddenly cause of Swine Flu in the presence of her physician and member of him/her family. He/she was alert and oriented at the time and him/her condition, while very serious, did not seem to indicate reason for immediate concern. Him/her unexpected death was devastating for her family and extremely distressing for all those involved in her care.
- An ICU physician suspected the cause the composition of solution being used to treat him/her failure. This was quickly confirmed and 30 bags of the solution made in the same batch were removed from patient care areas, undoubtedly preventing the deaths of other patients and investigation that how to solve detected problem.

Advantages

- ☐ Enhance design and manufacturing efficiencies
- ☐ Minimize exposure to product failures
- ☐ Augment business records
- ☐ Improve "bottom line" results
- ☐ Add to customer satisfaction
- ☐ Reliability also Improve

Limitation

- ☐ Employee training requirements
- ☐ Initial impact on product and manufacturing schedules
- ☐ Financial impact required to upgrade design, manufacturing, and

process equipment and tools

References

☐ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure mode and effects analysis □ http://www.stat.purdue.edu/~kuczek/stat513/IT%20381 Chap 7.pp http://www.ise.ncsu.edu/wysk/courses/ise497/IE497Failure%20Mo des%20and%20Effects%20Analysis%20%28FMEA%29.ppt http://castle.eiu.edu/~pingliu/tec5133/resources/spring 2010/studen t files/Failure%20Mode%20and%20Effect%20Analysis.ppt □ http://www.coe.montana.edu/me/faculty/larson/MET456 457/Failu re%20Modes%20and%20Effects%20Analysis%20%28FMEA%29. ppt ☐ B U Sonawane, Dr. B Rajiv, P K Chattopadhyay (2010), "Critical and Hazard Analysis of Various Components in a System using Risk Priority Number and Analytic Hierarchy Process", IE(I)

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Thank

You!!!